Ukraine’s (im)possible engagement with the Global South

29 July 2024

'Ukraine becomes a victim of international blame games, though it had nothing to do with Western colonial endeavours'

Figure: Dismantling works underway after the Summit on Peace in Ukraine in Switzerland. EPA, Urs Flueeler. https://platformraam.nl/dossiers/oekraine/2643-ukraines-im-possible-engagement-with-non-allied-countries

Bucerius Advisory Board Member Mykola Riabchuk, emphasises in his article that Ukraine should not focus on the fight against autocracy, but on its anti-colonial struggle in defence of national dignity, identity and sovereignty.

"[...] After a series of minor but painful military defeats, largely caused by the lack of much-needed ammunition, Ukraine also experienced several diplomatic setbacks at various fronts, even though Ukrainian officials still try to keep brave faces. Some of them were predictable – like a declarative ‘membership bridge’ (the so-called 'Ukraine Compact') instead of the much coveted road map to the North Atlantic alliance, offered to Ukrainians at the NATO summit in Washington, or the half-year Hungarian presidency in the EU, assumed in July, that enables a small but quite naughty country to undermine even more effectively Ukraine’s international position and chances for a just and reliable peace.

But the meager results of the international peace summit in Switzerland, long prepared and vehemently promoted by Kyiv as the arguably first step toward a peace settlement, came largely as a surprise. Shortly before the conference, president Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed his high expectations related to the event, which he saw as a means to attain more international solidarity and support, in particular from the Global South. 'The more such countries we have on our side ... the more Russia will have to deal with this,' he said in an interview with AFP.

Reluctance at the Peace Summit

Some attendees of the conference were reluctant to participate, as they hesitated between the normative UN principles and practical interests in relations with Russia. To placate them, the conference organizers picked up for discussion only the three least controversial issues from Volodymyr Zelensky’s ten-point ‘peace formula’, announced back in 2022. This did not help much, however. 

Less than half of the UN members accepted the invitation, and even less (80 of them) signed the final document, that addressed the problems of nuclear powers safety, food security and the exchange of prisoners. China was glaringly absent at the conference, and several other international ‘heavyweights’ like India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates were represented by lower-level diplomats who, notably, did not sign the final declaration. It was probably the reference to the UN Charter and 'respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty … as a basis for achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine' that made the document unpalatable for some Russia-friendly or Russia-aware governments.

The regress was obvious: back in March 2022, as many as 141 states (of 193 UN members) supported the UNGA resolution that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called for withdrawal of Russian troops from the country (only 5 countries voted against, 35 abstained, and 12 were not present).

Shifting positions 

There are probably many reasons for this shift – from the apparent frustration with the protracted war and a desire to end it as fast as possible at any cost (the cost of Ukraine, de facto), to all kinds of pragmatic (one may say opportunistic and cynical) interests in relations with Moscow and a reluctance to harm them with an ‘inappropriate’ vote.

Israel’s brutal response to the Hamas’ terrorist attack, condoned by Western governments, contributed to the negative attitude of the Global South countries to the ‘collective West’ and, collaterally, to Ukraine as the alleged Western ally (or client). For Ukrainians, as British columnist Patrick Wintour aptly noticed, 'Gaza has been a triple tragedy – it diverted world attention, it discredited the concept of rules-based order, and it divided the west, weakening Biden and the EU'.

Part of this harm was self-inflicted, since Ukrainian leaders were probably too fast and straightforward in their expression of unconditional support for Israel: Hamas and Russia, president Zelensky declared shortly after Hamas massacred Israeli civilians, are the 'same evil, and the only difference is that there is a terrorist organization that attacked Israel and here is a terrorist state that attacked Ukraine'. After Israel, in response, massacred thousands of Palestinians, the situation ceased to be as simple and clear: Putin and his daily terror in Ukraine were far away, while Netanyahu and his brutality was nearby, on all newsstands and TV screens.

The existing bias against Ukraine deepened, even though Ukraine never had anything to do with Western colonial adventures

It is debatable whether Zelensky’s 'immediate and forceful support for Israel in its fight against Hamas has imperiled almost a year of concerted efforts by Kyiv to win the support of Arab and Muslim nations in its war against Russia', as the Ukraine-based FT journalist Isabel Koshiw contended. The pro-Russian sympathies and anti-Western resentments in that part of the world were too deep and projected upon Ukraine by default, automatically, regardless of what president Zelensky said.

But the existing bias deepened, even though Ukraine never had anything to do with Western colonial adventures in the past or neocolonial policies at present. And Kyiv’s relations with Tel Aviv have always been rather lukewarm, especially on the Israeli side; Netanyahu has actually maintained much closer contacts with Putin than with Zelensky.[...]"